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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Jael Fraise, Alexander Kettles, and John Harris filed 
actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 challenging the 
constitutionality as applied to them of a New Jersey prison 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Honorable William W Schwarzer, United States District Court for 
the Northern District Court of California, sitting by designation. 
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policy that allows correctional officials to designate 
"security threat groups" ("STGs) and transfer core members 
of these groups to a special unit. Once in this unit, core 
members must participate in a behavior modification 
program before returning to the general prison population. 
The plaintiffs asserted that these regulations violate 
numerous constitutional provisions, including the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, who 
are New Jersey prison officials. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
Faced with increasing gang violence in correctional 
facilities throughout the state, the New Jersey Department 
of Corrections promulgated a policy in 1998 that was 
designed to isolate and rehabilitate gang members. Under 
this policy, prison officials can designate STGs and transfer 
the "core" members of these groups to the"Security Threat 
Group Management Unit" ("STGMU"). The goal of this policy 
is to "limit Security Threat Group activities and, in doing 
so, minimize the occurrence of assaults on staff and 
inmates." App. 125. 
 
The specifics of this policy were outlined in a Department 
of Corrections document entitled "Policy Statement for the 
Management of Security Threat Group Members" ("STG 
Policy"). See App. at 125-52. Related regulations were also 
issued. 
 
The STG Policy defines an STG as: 
 
       A group of inmates, designated by the Commissioner, 
       who may gather together regularly and informally, 
       possessing common characteristics, interests and goals 
       which serve to distinguish the group or group members 
       from other inmate groups or other inmates and which, 
       as a discrete entity, poses a threat to the safety of staff, 
       other inmates, the community, and/or damages to, or 
       destruction of property, and/or interrupting the safe, 
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       secure and orderly operation of the correctional 
       facility(ies). 
 
App. 126. STGs are officially designated by the 
Commissioner based on recommendations from the 
Intelligence Section of the Central Office Internal Affairs 
Unit ("Intelligence Section") of the Department of 
Corrections. See id. at 128. 
 
The STG Policy lists several factors that the Intelligence 
Section takes into account in considering whether a group 
should be designated as an STG. See id. These include the 
following characteristics of the group: (1) its history and 
purpose; (2) its organizational structure; (3) the propensity 
for violence of the group and its members; (4) actual or 
planned acts of violence reasonably attributable to the 
group; (5) other illegal or prohibited acts reasonably 
attributable to the group; (6) the "[d]emographics of the 
group," including its size, location, and pattern of 
expansion or decline; and (7) the degree of threat that the 
group poses. See App. 128. Designation of a group as an 
STG has the effect of prohibiting inmates from engaging in 
activities related to the group. Under prison regulations, it 
is a serious infraction for an inmate to "participat[e] in an 
activity related to a security threat group," N.J.A.C. 10A:4- 
4.1(.010), or to "possess[ ] or exhibit[ ] anything related to a 
security threat group." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(.011). It is also a 
serious infraction for an inmate to attempt to do either of 
the above. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(.803). 
 
The STG Policy lists criteria to be considered in 
determining whether a particular inmate should be 
classified as an STG member. These include: (1) an 
inmate's acknowledgment of membership; (2) the presence 
of an STG tattoo; (3) the possession of STG paraphernalia; 
(4) information from an outside agency; (5) information 
from an Internal Affairs report or investigation; (6) 
correspondence from other inmates or outside contacts; (7) 
STG photographs; and (8) any other factors that suggest 
that the inmate is involved in STG activities2 or is an STG 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Policy Statement defines "Security Threat Group Activities" as: 
 
       activities or actions of an inmate which relate either directly or 
       indirectly to goals of a Security Threat Group. These activities 
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member. See App. 129. Any inmate who satisfies two of 
these criteria may be designated as an STG member. 
 
An inmate may be identified as a "core" member of an 
STG if one or more of the following conditions is satisfied: 
 
       1. The inmate has a [Department of Corrections] 
       documented status as a recognized Security Threat 
       Group leader; 
 
       2. The inmate has taken a [Department of 
       Corrections] documented part/role in an activity, 
       behavior or involvement in an event/incident 
       associated with a Security Threat Group; 
 
       3. The inmate's [Department of Corrections] 
       documented activities, behavior or involvement in an 
       event/incident whether associated with a Security 
       Threat Group or not, poses a threat to the safety of 
       staff, other inmates, or the community; cause damages 
       to, or destruction of property; cause the interruption of 
       the safe, secure and orderly operation of the 
       correctional facilities; 
 
       4. The inmate has been identified as a Security Threat 
       Group Member and has been found guilty of a 
       prohibited act which is an asterisk offence [sic] in 
       accordance with N.J.A.C. 10A:4 "Inmate Disciple" 
       whether or not this offense was related to a Security 
       Threat Group's activities or not.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       include but are not limited to; Possession of Security Threat Group 
       literature such as lessons, membership lists, manuals and artwork; 
       Possession of Security Threat Group paraphernalia such as, beads, 
       artwork, medallions and clothing articles; Observation by staff of 
       known Security Threat Group hand-signs and/or signals; 
       Participation in Security Threat Group related assaults, 
       disturbances, meetings, gatherings, incidents and events; Sending 
       or receiving Security Threat Group related correspondence; 
       Recruiting of other inmates to join a Security Threat Group. 
 
App. at 126. 
 
3. The term "asterisk offense" designates a grade of inmate infraction. It 
is defined as "a prohibited act preceded by a number and an asterisk 
that is considered the most serious and results in the most severe 
sanction(s)." N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.2. 
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Id. at 130. 
 
If an inmate is identified as a core member, the inmate is 
transferred to the STGMU and placed in "Pre-Hearing 
Security Threat Group Management Unit" status. App. 131. 
At this point, the inmate is provided with written notice 
that he or she is being considered for placement in the 
STGMU and is given at least 48 hours' notice of the hearing 
before the STGMU Hearing Committee. Id. At the hearing, 
the inmate may appear in person or may present his or her 
case through a representative or through written 
submissions. Id. at 132. The STGMU Hearing Committee 
may validate the assignment of the inmate to the STGMU if 
the evidence supports a finding that the inmate is an STG 
member, has taken an active role in STG activities, and 
satisfies one of the four previously mentioned conditions. 
Id. at 133. If the STGMU Hearing Committee assigns the 
inmate to the STGMU, the inmate may appeal to the 
administrator of the prison. Id. The administrator's decision 
may then be challenged in state court. 
 
An inmate assigned to the STGMU remains in maximum 
custody until the inmate successfully completes a three- 
phase behavior modification and education program. App. 
135. This program "is designed to give the inmate the 
insight and tools necessary to interact appropriately, 
without the perceived need of membership in a Security 
Threat Group." Id. The inmate is taught anger 
management, conflict resolution, and social interactive 
skills that feature alternatives to violence. Id . The 
Committee monitors the inmate's progress and determines 
whether the inmate should advance to the next phase and 
eventually return to the general prison population. Id. In 
order to complete the program and return to the general 
prison population, an inmate must sign a form renouncing 
affiliation with all STGs. See App. at 248, 302-04, 443. 
 
B. 
 
The Five Percent Nation originated in New York City in 
the 1960s after its leader, Clarence Smith (also known as 
Clarence 13X and Father Allah), broke away from the 
Nation of Islam. The group's name derives from its belief in 
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"Supreme Mathematics," which breaks down the population 
of the world into three groups: the Ten Percent, the Eighty- 
Five Percent, and the Five Percent. 
 
The Ten Percent are those who have subjugated most of 
the world. They include white people and others who 
propagate the myth of a nonexistent "mystery God."4 The 
Ten Percent are described as follows in a Five Percent 
Nation text: 
 
       [The 10% are] the rich, slave makers of the poor. Who 
       teach[ ] the poor lies to believe that the Almighty true 
       and living God is a spook and cannot be seen by the 
       physical eye, otherwise known as the blood suckers of 
       the poor. 
 
App. 361. 
 
The Eighty-Five Percent are those who are subjugated 
and deceived. They "worship what they know not, .. . are 
easily led in the wrong direction but [are] hard to lead in 
the right direction." App. 361. 
 
Finally, the Five Percent are African Americans who have 
achieved self-knowledge. App. 361. They "know the black 
man's true nature and that God is within man himself." 
Appellants' Br. at 14. Male members of the group are 
referred to as "Gods," female members are called "Earths," 
and the group often refers to itself as "The Nation of Gods 
and Earths." See App. 458. A declaration of a member 
explains: 
 
        . . . The Nation of Gods and Earths emphasizes the 
       individual, human freedom and choice. 
 
        . . . Our teachings include texts such as the Bible, 
       the Koran, "The 120 Degrees," "Supreme Mathematics," 
       and "Supreme Alphabet". 
 
        . . . The Nation of Gods and Earths teaches that. . . 
       our status, as black men, is commensurate with that 
       of the Supreme being. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As stated in one of the group's "lessons": "There is no mystery God. 
The SON OF MAN has searched for that mystery God for trillions of 
years and was unable to find this so-called mystery God." App. 360. 
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        . . . We teach man to stop looking for a mystical God 
       to come and solve our problems but to take 
       responsibility to solve our own problems ourselves. 
 
        . . . We teach that worship of Allah is tantamount to 
       worship of oneself and that everyone has "God" within 
       him. 
 
App. 458-59. 
 
Despite the mysterious murder of Clarence 13X in June 
of 1969, the Five Percent Nation flourished in certain prison 
systems. According to a report prepared by Roland Holvey 
of the New Jersey Department of Corrections Internal 
Affairs Office ("the Holvey Report"), the Five Percent Nation 
became such a strong presence in New York prisons that 
Hispanic inmates were prompted to form their own gang, 
known as the Latin Kings, to protect themselves from 
attacks by Five Percenters. The Five Percent Nation became 
active in New Jersey prisons in the early 1980s and has 
since become the largest group in the state's prison system. 
In addition to New York and New Jersey, the group is also 
known to exist in Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 
 
The Five Percent Nation claims that it does not promote 
or advocate violence, but evidence links the group with 
numerous incidents of prison violence. Indeed, according to 
the Holvey report, many in the law enforcement community 
consider the Five Percent Nation to be "one of the greatest 
threats to the social fabric" of the prisons. See App. 336. In 
support of this conclusion, the Holvey report cites a string 
of incidents that occurred in New Jersey prisons between 
August 1990 and July 1997. See App. at 341-43. In August 
1990, a Five Percenter was a member of a small group of 
inmates who repeatedly stabbed a prison officer and 
severely beat other officers. See App. at 341. In May 1993, 
an investigation revealed that a Five Percenter sent an 
anonymous letter threatening the lives of prison staff at 
East Jersey State Prison. See id. In December 1993, more 
than 30 inmates at Northern State Prison participated in a 
group demonstration in the gymnasium during afternoon 
recess. See id. A subsequent investigation revealed that the 
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group was planning to assault prison staff because prison 
officials refused to recognize the Five Percent Nation as a 
religion. See id. Information was also received that the Five 
Percenters were planning to "take a cop" in the afternoon. 
See Sealed Appendix at 24. In March 1995, two Five 
Percenters in the Southern State Correctional Facility were 
involved in an altercation inside a housing unit. See id. at 
342. In May 1996, approximately 50 to 60 inmates 
belonging to the Five Percent Nation or a rival gang 
conducted an unauthorized meeting during evening 
recreation. See id. In August 1996, a melee broke out 
between Five Percenters and another group in a state 
prison. See id. Between 25 and 30 inmates were involved in 
fights. See id. On a day in November 1996, 24 inmates in 
a youth correctional facility who were affiliated with the 
Five Percent Nation or rival Hispanic gangs were involved in 
three separate incidents. See id. In February 1997, a Five 
Percenter at Riverfront State Prison attacked and seriously 
injured a correctional officer. See id. at 343. The officer 
suffered a punctured lung after being stabbed with a 
homemade knife. See id. After the attack, four other Five 
Percenters barricaded themselves in the gymnasium, set 
fires, and damaged prison property. See id. Also in 
February 1997, a member of the Five Percent Nation was 
involved in a fight with another inmate. See id.  In March 
1997, officers at Riverfront State Prison received 
information that Five Percenters had contracted with 
members of another gang to assault prison staff members. 
See id. In July 1997, Five Percenters at Middlesex County 
Jail participated in a hunger strike. See id.  Officers were 
required to use smoke and concussion grenades to enter 
two barricaded housing units. See id. 
 
Based largely on the recommendations of Investigator 
Holvey and others in the Intelligence Section, the 
Commissioner designated the Five Percent Nation as an 
STG. The Commissioner also designated two Hispanic 
gangs, the Latin Kings and the NETAs, and two white 
gangs, the Prison Bikers Brotherhood and the Aryan 
Brothers. App. 280. On March 4, 1998, several inmates, 
including plaintiffs Alexander Kettles and John Harris, were 
identified as core members of the Five Percent Nation and 
transferred to the STGMU. See Appellants' Br. at 9. Kettles 
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acknowledges being a member of the Five Percent Nation, 
see App. at 36 (Kettles's Affidavit), while Harris denies 
membership. See App. 61 (Harris's Affidavit). Harris claims 
to be a Rastafarian who "gain[s] personal and spiritual 
fulfillment by examining and studying all religions, 
including The Five Percent Nation." Id. He believes that 
studying other religions enables him to "better understand 
and accept others['] points of view." Id. He asserts that he 
was falsely identified as a Five Percenter simply because he 
received a letter from a friend who was a member and 
because some of his Rastafarian literature contained a Five 
Percent Nation symbol. He refused to sign a statement 
disavowing association with STGs because he believes that 
signing would amount to an admission that he belongs to 
the Five Percent Nation. See id. at 62. The third plaintiff, 
Jael Fraise, admits membership in the Five Percent Nation. 
See Appellants' Brief at 9. He was validated as a core 
member and transferred to the STGMU based on his 
possession of Five Percenter material. See id.  
 
Kettles, Harris, and Fraise filed separate lawsuits against 
Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C.S 1983, 
asserting that their treatment under the STG Policy violated 
their constitutional rights. They sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief and damages. 
 
C. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, the District Court granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court first 
addressed the plaintiffs' claims that the enforcement of the 
STG Policy had violated their rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause. Although the defendants contended that the Five 
Percent Nation is not a "religion" within the meaning of the 
First Amendment, the Court did not resolve this issue but 
rather assumed for the sake of argument that the Five 
Percent Nation is a "religion." The Court then applied the 
standard set out by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78 (1987), for assessing prison regulations that 
restrict inmates' constitutional rights. Under Turner, a 
regulation passes muster if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests. See 482 U.S. at 89. Turner 
instructs courts to weigh four factors when applying this 
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standard: first, whether the regulation bears a"valid, 
rational connection" to a legitimate and neutral 
governmental objective; second, whether prisoners have 
alternative ways of exercising the circumscribed right; 
third, whether accommodating the right would have a 
deleterious impact on other inmates, guards, and the 
allocation of prison resources generally; and fourth, 
whether alternatives exist that "fully accommodate[ ] the 
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological 
interests." Id. at 91. 
 
With respect to the first factor, the District Court noted 
that the designation of the Five Percent Nation as an STG 
was based on concern about security. The Court recognized 
this as a valid penological concern that is unrelated to the 
suppression of expression and is consequently neutral for 
purposes of the Turner analysis. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 14; see 
also id. After finding "ample evidence that the Five Percent 
Nation as a group poses a threat to prison security," the 
Court concluded that the decision to designate the Five 
Percent Nation as an STG was rationally related to this 
legitimate and neutral government objective. Id.  at 14-15. 
The Court also held that the STG Policy's restrictions on 
the activities of STG members were all rationally related to 
the goal of prison safety and security. See id.  at 15-19. The 
Court thus concluded that the first Turner factor weighed in 
favor of the STG Policy. 
 
In analyzing the second factor -- the availability of 
alternative ways of exercising the circumscribed right -- the 
District Court stated that "[t]here must simply be some 
form of expression available to the inmates . . . and here 
that requirement is met." Dist. Ct. Op. at 20 (citing O'Lone 
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987)). The Court 
noted that the STG Policy does not impose a total ban on 
association and expression by STG members and that such 
inmates continue to have opportunities to participate in 
religious programs, to fast and pray, to possess certain 
religious items, and to express their political, social, and 
cultural views in other ways. See id. at 21. 
 
Turning to the third factor -- the impact that 
accommodating the asserted constitutional right would 
have on other inmates, guards, and the allocation of prison 
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resources generally -- the District Court believed that 
"[a]ccomodating plaintiffs' desire to associate and engage in 
STG activities . . . undoubtedly would adversely impact the 
inmate population and prison staff at all correctional 
facilities by exposing them to a greater risk of assault and 
disturbance." Id. at 22. The Court thus held that the STG 
Policy satisfied Turner's third factor. 
 
Finally, the District Court held that the Policy was also 
supported by the fourth factor -- the absence of 
alternatives that would fully accommodate the prisoner's 
rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. The 
Court opined that "[r]equiring an accommodation, like 
mandating further STG activity on the part of inmates prior 
to classification, or further demonstration of [a particular 
inmate's] dangerousness before placement at the STGMU, 
[would] expose[ ] the general inmate population and the 
correctional facility staff to an increased risk of violence." 
Dist Ct. Op. at 23. The Court did not feel that an 
individualized determination of the threat presented by 
each inmate identified as an STG member was a viable 
alternative because, among other things, it would place an 
undue burden on prison staff. See id. at 24. Accordingly, 
the Court held that all four of Turner's prongs weighed in 
favor of the STG Policy, that the Policy was reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests, and that it did 
not violate the plaintiffs' free exercise rights. 
 
The District Court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that 
the defendants had violated their equal protection rights by 
singling out their religion for unfavorable treatment. The 
Court noted that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution 
which requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups 
alike where differentiation is necessary to avoid an 
imminent threat of institutional disruption or violence." 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 24-25 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977)). Finally, the 
District Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the 
Department of Corrections violated due process by failing to 
give adequate notice before promulgating and acting 
pursuant to the STG Policy. The Court held that the 
plaintiffs had not shown that placement in the STGMU 
deprived them of a protected liberty interest. The plaintiffs 
then took this appeal. 
 
                                12 
  
II 
 
We first address the plaintiffs' claim that the STG Policy 
violates their First Amendment right to the free exercise of 
their religion. All parties urge us to resolve this issue by 
applying the standards set out in Turner, and we take that 
approach.5 
 
In Turner, the Supreme Court began by noting that 
"[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
inmates from the protections of the Constitution." 482 U.S. 
at 84. The Court recognized, however, that inmates' 
constitutional rights must in some respects be limited in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is not clear that Turner factors should be considered before 
determining whether a contested prison regulation would violate the 
constitutional right that the inmate invokes if the regulation were 
applied to persons not in prison. After all, incarceration almost always 
results in a narrowing, not a broadening, of constitutional protections. 
 
Turner discussed five prior Supreme Court cases involving inmate 
constitutional claims, and in all of those cases the challenged prison 
regulation would have been plainly unconstitutional outside the prison 
context. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(restrictions on 
the contents of incoming and outgoing prisoner mail); Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817 (1974)(restrictions on face-to-face media interviews with 
individual inmates); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, Inc., 433 
U.S. 119 (1977)(regulations prohibiting meetings, solicitations, and bulk 
mailings related to prison union); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
(1979)(restrictions on inmates' receipt of hardcover books not mailed 
directly from publishers, book clubs, or book stores); Block v. 
Rutherford, 
468 U.S. 576 (1984)(ban on contact visits). The same is true of Turner 
itself, which concerned restrictions on the right of inmates to correspond 
with other prisoners and to marry, as well as O'Lone v. Shabazz, supra, 
which involved restrictions on attendance at religious services. 
 
The defendants have not argued, however, that we should first 
determine whether the regulations at issue here would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause if applied outside the prison context. See Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); 
Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). We therefore do not reach this issue. 
 
We also note that the plaintiffs have not raised any argument under 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 
U.S.C. S 2000cc-1, which may address some of the concerns expressed 
by the dissent, and we therefore do not discuss that statute. 
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order to accommodate the demands of prison 
administration and to serve valid penological objectives. See 
id. The Court also emphasized that the judiciary is "ill 
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of 
prison administration and reform" and should therefore 
give significant deference to judgments made by prison 
officials in establishing, interpreting, and applying prison 
regulations. See id. at 84-85. Accordingly, the Court held, 
prison regulations that curtail an inmate's constitutional 
rights need only be reasonably related to legitimate 
penological objectives. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. See also, 
e.g., Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1988). As noted, 
under the Turner framework, four factors must be 
considered in assessing the reasonableness of such 
regulations. Id. at 90-91. We will discuss each of these 
factors separately. 
 
A. 
 
We agree with the District Court that the STG Policy is 
supported by Turner's first prong. A prison regulation fails 
this prong if it "promotes an interest that is illegitimate or 
not neutral, or . . . bears no `valid, rational connection' to 
the asserted interest." Waterman, 183 F.3d at 214 (quoting 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90). Here, contrary to the suggestion 
of the dissent that the New Jersey scheme "targets 
members of one religion," Dissent at 27, the STG Policy is 
entirely neutral and does not in any way take religion into 
account. It is also beyond dispute that New Jersey has a 
legitimate penological interest in maintaining order and 
security within the prison system. See O'Lone , 482 U.S. at 
350-51; Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-92. Recognizing this, the 
plaintiffs challenge the STG Policy by arguing that the 
Holvey Report does not provide a sufficient basis for 
concluding that prison violence can be attributed to the 
Five Percent Nation. See Appellants' Br. at 21-22. The 
plaintiffs maintain that there has been "no showing . . . 
that a greater proportion of Five Percenters are more violent 
than a group of Christians, Muslims, Jews or atheists" and 
that the Holvey Report found only that some Five 
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Percenters are violent. Id. at 24. Contending that the 
decision to classify the Five Percenters as an STG was 
based on a report full of "unfounded speculations," the 
plaintiffs argue that the STG Policy and the restrictions 
imposed on them are not rationally related to the legitimate 
objective of maintaining prison order and security. We 
disagree. 
 
As discussed above, the Holvey Report recounts 
numerous instances of actual or planned violence involving 
Five Percenters in New Jersey correctional facilities from 
August 1990 through July 1997. See App. 341-43. 
Although the plaintiffs and the dissent contend that these 
incidents are insufficient to justify STG treatment, Turner 
instructs judges to exercise great caution before second- 
guessing the expert judgment of correctional officials on a 
question of this nature. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85; 
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000). The Turner 
Court wrote: 
 
       "[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly 
       urgent problems of prison administration and reform.' " 
       [Martinez v. Procunier, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).] As 
       the Martinez Court acknowledged, "the problems of 
       prisons in America are complex and intractable. . . . 
       Id., at 404-405. Running a prison is an inordinately 
       difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, 
       and the commitment of resources, all of which are 
       peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
       executive branches of government. Prison 
       administration is, moreover, a task that has been 
       committed to the responsibility of those branches, and 
       separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of 
       judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is 
       involved, federal courts have, as we indicated in 
       Martinez, additional reason to accord deference to the 
       appropriate prison authorities. See id., at 405. 
 
To these observations, we would add that a measure of 
deference is especially appropriate when a regulation 
implicates prison security. 
 
Viewing the summary judgment record in the manner 
dictated by Turner, we are satisfied that the defendants had 
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adequate grounds for concluding that inmates belonging to 
the Five Percent Nation present a serious security threat. 
 
We note that other courts have reached the same 
conclusion. The Fourth Circuit has observed, the Five 
Percent Nation has a "history of violence" in the South 
Carolina prison system. See In re Long Term Admin. 
Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters , 174 
F.3d 464, 466-69 (4th Cir. 1999) (hereinafter " Five 
Percenters")(describing violent incidents involving members 
of the group and referring to a federal intelligence summary 
that called the Five Percenters a "radical Islamic 
sect/criminal group" that "is often boldly racist in its views, 
prolific in its criminal activities, and operates behind a 
facade of cultural and religious rhetoric"). The United 
States District Court for the Western District of New York 
reached a similar conclusion concerning the New York 
system. See Self-Allah v. Annucci, No. 97-CV-607(H), 1999 
WL 299310, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1999)(referring to the 
"substantial history of violence associated with Five 
Percenter activities" and finding that the Department of 
Corrections "reasonably concluded that Five Percenters 
represent a STG within the [New York] prison system"). 
That court wrote: 
 
       [T]he Five Percenters act as an organized group within 
       the prison system to receive new members, intimidate 
       members of rival groups, and participate in criminal 
       activity, including extortion, robbery, assaults and 
       drug trafficking. Seemingly innocuous literature is 
       used to send messages in code form. Five Percenter 
       literature also assists in keeping the gang organized, in 
       allowing members of the group to be identified, and in 
       legitimizing the group and its violent activities. 
 
Id. Several other courts -- including a state court in New 
Jersey -- have also referred to the close connection between 
the Five Percent Nation and violence or gang-related 
activity. See Allah v. Beyer, 1994 WL 549614, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 29, 1994); Box v. Petsock, 697 F. Supp. 821, 831 
(M.D. Pa. 1987); Allah v. Department of Corr. , 742 A.2d 162, 
165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Buford v. Goord, 686 
N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (referring to the 
Five Percent Nation as "an unauthorized organization that 
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engages in gang-related activity both inside and outside of 
the facility"). We agree with these courts and therefore hold 
that there is a rational connection between New Jersey's 
STG regulations and the legitimate and neutral objective of 
maintaining order and security within the prison system.6 
 
The dissent disagrees with our evaluation of the first 
Turner factor primarily because the dissent is unwilling to 
accord any significant deference to the judgment of the 
responsible New Jersey officials that the Five Percent 
Nation presents a security threat within the state's 
correctional system. The dissent disparages the Holvey 
report because Holvey's "credentials consist largely of on- 
the-job training." Dissent at 32. The dissent characterizes 
the incidents of actual or planned violence recounted in the 
report as merely "anecdotal" evidence and then diminishes 
the significance of particular incidents on a variety of 
grounds. Dissent at 32-33 n.9. For example, the dissent 
describes as merely a "gathering" an incident in which 
members of the Five Percent Nation congregated in a gym 
to protest their treatment by the authorities, and 
correctional officials received information that the Five 
Percenters were planning to "take a cop." Id. Incidents in 
which Five Percenters attacked and seriously wounded 
correctional staff are dismissed as simply "involving a single 
FPN member." Id. What the dissent seems to demand is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In fact, there is evidence in the record that the STG policy has been 
effective in reducing violence in prisons. As Investigator Holvey 
testified 
during his deposition: "I can also say that since the opening of the 
Security Threat Group Management Unit on March 4th of 1998, there 
have been no serious incidents, gang-related incidents, within the whole 
Department of Corrections. There's no question that it's a direct result 
of 
the initiative of the Security Threat Group Management Unit." App. at 
259. According to Holvey, prior to the STG Policy,"[e]very day there 
would be some kind of gang-related incidents related to one of these five 
gangs [that had been designated as Security Threat Groups]." Id. Howard 
Beyer, the Assistant Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections, also submitted an affidavit indicating that the program has 
been successful. See App. at 84 ("The use of close custody units has 
proven successful in the maintenance of discipline, security, safety, and 
an orderly operation of correctional facilities in the New Jersey 
Department of Corrections and will continue to assist the administrators 
and management in the inmate population."). 
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either (a) proof that the tenets of the Five Percent Nation 
require members to engage in violence7  or (b) hard 
statistical proof that members of the Five Percent Nation 
commit proportionally more acts of violence in New Jersey 
prisons than do members of other religions.8 Demanding 
proof of this stature before correctional officials can act to 
prevent gang violence is fundamentally inconsistent with 
Turner and would in all likelihood be paralyzing. 
 
B. 
 
1. We now consider the District Court's analysis of the 
second Turner factor. As noted, this factor requires a court 
to assess whether inmates retain alternative means of 
exercising the circumscribed right. See Turner , 482 U.S. at 
90; DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. When assessing the availability 
of alternatives, the right in question must be viewed 
"sensibly and expansively." DeHart, 227 F.3d at 53 (quoting 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989)). Therefore, 
in a free exercise case, we must consider whether the 
inmate has "alternative means of practicing his or her 
religion generally, not whether [the] inmate has alternative 
means of engaging in [any] particular practice." Id. at 55. 
We will first discuss the restrictions that the New Jersey 
Policy imposed on the plaintiffs simply because they were 
designated as members of the Five Percent Nation; we will 
then consider the additional restriction imposed as a result 
of their validation as core members. 
 
2. Ordinary members. In applying the second Turner 
factor in a free exercise case, we must of course focus on 
the beliefs of the inmate asserting the claim. It is obviously 
impossible to determine whether a regulation leaves an 
inmate with alternative ways of practicing the inmate's 
religion without identifying the religion's practices. The 
plaintiffs bore the burden of producing evidence of their 
beliefs and practices. In order to do this, they submitted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Dissent at 31 (demanding proof that "membership in the Five 
Percent Nation carried with it a set of beliefs that each member acts 
upon to promote violence and disorder" or proof that "membership 
equates to an active commitment to violence"). 
 
8. See Dissent at 32-33. 
 
                                18 
  
the declaration of G. Kalim, a member of the Five Percent 
Nation and the editor of a newspaper called The Five 
Percenter. See App. 457-60. Mr. Kalim's declaration 
explains the basic beliefs and practices of the Five Percent 
Nation, and we have therefore closely examined Mr. Kalim's 
declaration to determine the degree to which the challenged 
STG Policy restricts the plaintiffs' religious practices. 
 
Mr. Kalim's declaration describes the Five Percent Nation 
(or The Nation of Gods and Earths, as he calls it) as a 
loosely structured group -- in his words, "a group of people 
who share a common way of life." App. 459. His declaration 
does not state that members of the group are required, 
expected, or counseled to participate in or attend any rites 
or gatherings or to perform any acts of religious 
observance. Indeed, his declaration states that"[t]o become 
a member . . . , all one need do is study the lessons and 
aspire to live a righteous life." Id. at 459. His declaration 
makes it clear that the group rejects belief in the 
transcendent and instead focuses on human enlightenment 
and conduct as ends in themselves. According to Mr. 
Kalim, the Five Percent Nation "teach[es] man to stop 
looking for a mystical God" and "emphasizes the individual, 
human freedom and choice." Id. at 458. He states that the 
group teaches people to attain "knowledge and 
enlightenment," to have "respect for society," and to eschew 
violence and disavow "white hatred." Id . He adds that the 
group attempts "to train young individuals to better 
themselves in the community" and that the group's 
"principal purpose is to teach our young self worth, 
responsibility, and self love." Id. The group appears to 
believe that these goals can be achieved by understanding 
the group's view of world history, see id., but it seems clear 
that an understanding of this is viewed as a means to 
enlightenment and right behavior, not an end. 
 
Based on Mr. Kalim's declaration, it appears that one 
central practice of the Five Percent Nation is restricted by 
the STG Policy provisions applicable to ordinary members, 
namely, the ability to "study the lessons." App. 459. As 
noted, the Policy prohibits inmates from "participating in 
any activity(ies) related to a security threat group" or 
possessing the group's literature. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4- 
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4.1(.010), (.011). However, even the study of the Five 
Percent Nation's teachings is not completely prohibited. Mr. 
Kalim's declaration states that the group's "teachings 
include texts such as the Bible [and] the Koran."9 App. 458. 
While the STG Policy forbids possession of distinctively Five 
Percent Nation literature, it is undisputed that the Policy 
allows inmates to possess, study, and discuss the Bible and 
the Koran. Accordingly, study of the Five Percent Nation's 
teachings is only partially restricted. 
 
The STG Policy appears to leave ample room for all of the 
remaining activities mentioned in Mr. Kalim's declaration. 
Certainly nothing in the STG Policy restricts Five Percent 
Nation members from discussing or seeking to achieve self- 
knowledge, self-respect, responsible conduct, or righteous 
living. To be sure, the STG Policy restricts the ability of Five 
Percenters to achieve these things by following what the 
group may regard as the best avenue, i.e., by studying and 
discussing doctrines and materials distinctive to the Five 
Percent Nation. But alternative avenues clearly remain 
open. 
 
In sum, our examination of the second Turner factor in 
relation to the plaintiffs' explanation of their beliefs leads us 
to the conclusion that, while the New Jersey STG policy 
undoubtedly imposes restrictions on the ability of rank- 
and-file Five Percenters to engage in activities related to the 
group, the Policy does not foreclose all alternative avenues 
of practice. 
 
3. Core members. Application of the second Turner 
factor to "core" members presents an additional difficulty 
because the Policy requires core members assigned to the 
STGMU to renounce "affiliation" with their STG as a 
condition of returning to the general inmate population. See 
App. at 248, 302-04, 443. If the STG Policy demanded that 
core members of the Five Percent Nation renounce the 
beliefs of the group, we could not say that the second 
Turner factor is satisfied. We do not, however, interpret the 
STG Policy as demanding a renunciation of beliefs. (The 
Policy does not, for example, require a core member to deny 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As the plaintiffs put it in their brief, members of the group "study 
the 
writings from the various recognized religions." Appellants' Br. at 14. 
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the truth of the "Supreme Mathematics.") What it requires 
instead is a promise not to associate with certain other 
prisoners while in prison. 
 
The form that a core member must sign requires the core 
member to renounce "affiliation with all Security Threat 
Groups," App. 443, and a security threat group is defined 
by the Policy as "[a] group of inmates . . . who may gather 
together regularly and informally . . . ." Id . at 126. Thus, 
what is required is a renunciation of affiliation with a 
particular group of inmates (those who belong to an STG), 
not a renunciation of beliefs. In simpler terms, the Policy 
requires the end of any form of gang membership or 
participation. In view of this interpretation of the STG 
Policy, we conclude that even core members of the Five 
Percent Nation retain alternative avenues of practicing their 
religion, namely, those previously discussed in connection 
with ordinary members. 
 
C. 
 
We agree with the District Court's analysis of Turner's 
third prong. "When accommodation of an asserted right will 
have a significant `ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on 
prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the 
informed discretion of corrections officials." Turner, 482 
U.S. at 90. The record, as noted, contains evidence that 
Five Percenters pose a security threat to prison officials and 
other inmates. Dist. Ct. Op. at 22. As the Fourth Circuit 
has stated: 
 
       Prison administration often involves tough tradeoffs. In 
       the closed environment of a prison, greater liberties for 
       some may mean increased danger and intimidation for 
       others. Because increased freedom for the Five 
       Percenters would come "only at the cost of significantly 
       less liberty and safety for everyone else, guards and 
       other prisoners alike," we are particularly reluctant to 
       interfere with the judgment of the [prison officials] in 
       this case. 
 
Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 470 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. 
at 92-93). Particularly in light of the highly deferential 
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standard of review that applies here, we agree with the 
Fourth Circuit and conclude that this factor is satisfied. 
 
D. 
 
We also agree that Turner's fourth factor weighs in favor 
of the Policy. Turner does not impose a least-restrictive- 
alternative test. See Waterman, 183 F.3d at 219. Rather, 
our inquiry is whether there are alternatives that would 
impose only "de minimis cost to valid penological interests." 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. 
 
In this case, the District Court considered alternatives to 
the New Jersey system, such as toughening the showing 
needed for STG designation, but concluded that these 
would expose "the general inmate population and the 
correctional facility staff to an increased risk of violence." 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 23. The plaintiffs argue that the District 
Court misunderstood their argument. See Appellants' Br. at 
32. They contend that the Department of Corrections 
should not have designated "an entire belief system," i.e., 
the Five Percent Nation, as an STG but instead should have 
designated only "specific hierarchical `gangs' with members 
who are Five Percenters." We disagree. We reiterate that our 
inquiry is not whether the state could have adopted a less 
restrictive alternative but rather whether it could have 
adopted an alternative that imposed only "de minimis cost 
to legitimate penological interests." Turner , 482 U.S. at 91. 
As we have explained, the state had adequate grounds for 
concluding that the Five Percent Nation presented a threat 
to prison order and security. The alternatives to which the 
plaintiffs point would have done less to mitigate this threat 
and thus would have had a more than de minimis impact 
on the state's legitimate penological concerns. Therefore, we 
agree with the District Court that the final Turner factor 
supports the Policy. 
 
E. 
 
We have concluded that three of the four Turner factors 
weigh strongly in favor of the STG Policy. These factors are 
the existence of a "valid, rational connection" to a legitimate 
and neutral governmental objective, the effect that 
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accommodating the plaintffs would have on other inmates, 
guards, and the allocation of prison resources generally, 
and the availability of alternative regulatory approaches 
that would "fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner's rights at de 
minimis cost to valid penological interests." The remaining 
factor -- the availability of alternative means of exercising 
the circumscribed right -- presents a closer question, but 
we hold that it too is met. Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the District Court that the challenged STG 
Policy does not violate the plaintiffs' free exercise rights. 
Accord In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates 
Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 
1999)(upholding similar South Carolina policy). 
 
III. 
 
We now consider the plaintiffs' argument that the 
defendants violated their equal protection rights by treating 
them less favorably than members of other religious 
groups. See Appellants' Br. at 40. In making this argument, 
the plaintiffs point to the Sunni Muslims, and claim that 
this group, although similar to the Five Percent Nation, has 
been treated less harshly. According to the plaintiffs, the 
Sunni Muslims have several of the characteristics of an 
STG, such as a common history and purpose, an 
organizational structure, recognized leaders, customary 
salutations, and a considerable size. They also note that 
Holvey admitted during his deposition that some Sunni 
Muslims had shown "a propensity for violence . . . [o]n 
occasion" and that some illegal or prohibited acts "could be 
associated with Sunni Muslims." See Appellants' Br. at 35- 
36. They also rely on Holvey's statement that the"big" 
difference between the Sunni Muslims and the Five Percent 
Nation is that the Sunnis practice a religion and the Five 
Percenters do not. See id. at 37. 
 
In DeHart, our court, sitting en banc, held that when an 
inmate asserts an equal protection claim based on the 
allegedly disparate treatment of different religious groups, 
the governing standard is whether the disparate treatment 
is " `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' " 
227 F.3d at 61 (citation omitted). That standard is met 
here. While relying on one portion of Holvey's deposition, 
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the plaintiffs do not mention another part of the deposition 
in which Holvey stated that the Sunni Muslims have a 
much lower propensity for violence than the Five 
Percenters. See App. 214. Moreover, while Holvey cited 
religion as a major difference between the two groups, 
Holvey did not state that religion played any role in the 
decision whether to designate either group as an STG. We 
note that the STG Policy makes no reference to religion, 
and we are not aware of any other evidence in the record 
that suggests that religion plays any role in STG 
designation decisions. In view of greater propensity for 
violence demonstrated by members of the Five Percent 
Nation, we hold that the group's designation as an STG 
does not violate equal protection. 
 
IV. 
 
The plaintiffs' final argument is that the Department of 
Corrections violated their due process rights by failing to 
provide any notice of the new regulations until the day of 
the plaintiffs' transfer to the STGMU. The plaintiffs contend 
that this deprived them of any opportunity to modify their 
behavior to comply with the new regulations. See  Reply 
Brief at 16-17. The District Court rejected this argument, 
concluding that the plaintiffs were not deprived of a 
protected liberty interest. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 26-28. We 
agree. 
 
To succeed on their due process claim, the plaintiffs 
must first demonstrate that they were deprived of a liberty 
interest when they were transferred to the STGMU. 
"Protected liberty . . . interests generally arise either from 
the Due Process Clause or from state-created statutory 
entitlement." Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 
2000); see also Asquith v. Dep't of Corrections , 186 F.3d 
407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has recognized 
that "[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to 
which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence 
imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the 
Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself 
subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to 
judicial oversight." Asquith, 186 F.3d at 410 (quoting Hewitt 
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). Here, the plaintiffs 
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were not subjected to confinement that exceeded the 
sentences imposed upon them or that otherwise violated 
the Constitution, and therefore no liberty interest created 
by the Due Process Clause itself was impinged. See Hewitt, 
459 U.S. at 468 ("It is plain that the transfer of an inmate 
to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for 
nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement 
ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence."). 
 
The defendants are also unable to demonstrate that they 
were deprived of a state-created liberty interest. In Sandin 
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Supreme Court set 
out the standard for determining whether a prisoner has 
been deprived of a state-created liberty interest. These 
interests are "generally limited to freedom from restraint 
which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an 
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due 
Process Clause of its own force, . . . nonetheless imposes 
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id.; see also Shoats, 
213 F.3d at 143; Asquith, 186 F.3d at 412. In ascertaining 
whether something is an "atypical and significant" 
hardship, we must consider "what a sentenced inmate may 
reasonably expect to encounter as a result of his or her 
conviction in accordance with due process of law." Asquith, 
186 F.3d at 412 (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 
706 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). Consequently, the focus of this 
inquiry should not be on the language of a particular 
regulation, but rather on the nature of the deprivation. See 
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82. Although inmates who are 
transferred to the STGMU face additional restrictions, we 
hold that the transfer to the STGMU does not impose an 
atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life. See Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706-08 (15 
months in administrative segregation not atypical and 
significant hardship); see also, e.g., Jones v. Baker, 155 
F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 1998)(confinement in administrative 
segregation for two and one-half years is not "atypical and 
significant" hardship); Pichardo v. Kinker , 73 F.3d 612, 613 
(5th Cir. 1996)(rejecting as frivolous a claim that 
classification as gang member and placement in 
administrative segregation unit deprived inmate of a 
protected liberty interest). Thus, the plaintiffs lack a 
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protected liberty interest and their due process claim must 
fail. In addition, even if the plaintiffs had been deprived of 
a protected liberty interest, the procedures used in 
determining whether an inmate is a core STG member 
satisfy procedural due process. See Shoats, 213 F.3d at 
144-47. As noted, an inmate who is identified as a core 
STG member receives notice and a hearing at which the 
inmate may be heard. The inmate may appeal an adverse 
decision to the administrator of the prison and may obtain 
judicial review in state court. These procedures satisfy due 
process. Id. As for the plaintiffs' complaint that they were 
identified as core members based on conduct that occurred 
before the STG Policy was promulgated, we held in Shoats 
that due process is not violated by placing an inmate in 
administrative custody based on past conduct that 
furnishes a basis for predicting that the inmate will engage 
in future acts of violence if corrective measures are not 
taken. Id. at 146-47. 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the decision 
of the District Court. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I disagree with the reasoning of, and result reached by, 
both the District Court and the majority. I think we are 
faced here with an issue of much greater import, both 
practically and analytically, than mere permissible prison 
regulation. While some measure of deference is certainly to 
be afforded to prison authorities, nonetheless we must 
make certain that we do not convert the Turner v. Safley 
test into a rubber stamp. Here, the policy at issue has been 
applied so as to target a religious group for different 
treatment, including a blanket denial of First Amendment 
rights.1 We must deal with this wholesale treatment of 
members of a religious group in a careful manner. 
 
Appellants urge us to address the following question: 
When the prison adopts a policy and then targets members 
of one religion and imposes significant burdens on-- even 
perhaps totally impedes -- their religious exercise, based 
solely on the prisoners' religious affiliation, does not the 
first prong of the Turner v. Safley test require that the 
violence of the group and the members subjected to this 
treatment be clearly proven in order for such group 
treatment to be "reasonably related" to the legitimate goal?2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While providing a detailed description of the procedures provided by 
the STG policy, the majority does not reference the extensive restrictions 
imposed on Appellants. According to the STG policy, restrictions on 
inmates in Phase 1 of the program include: strip-searches each time they 
leave or return to their cells; a total of five hours per week out of 
their 
cells; a shower or shave only every third day; only a single, non-contact 
visit each month; only one monitored phone call per week; prohibition on 
correspondence with any other inmate, including incarcerated family 
members; all meals eaten in cells; and, no access to regular prison 
programs. App. at A138-42, 148. Further, the Policy instructs that 
"[t]here is a `Zero Tolerance' level for Security Threat Group activity 
within the Department's correctional facility(ies)." App. at A152. 
Examples of such activities include: "Possession of Security Threat 
Group literature such as lessons, membership lists, and artwork; 
Possession of Security Threat Group paraphernalia such as beads, 
artwork, medallions, and clothing articles; . . . Participation in 
Security 
Threat Group related . . . meetings, gatherings, . .. and events . . . ." 
App. at A152. 
 
2. One could quibble with whether the restrictions are on all members, 
because the close custody only applies to those determined to be "core 
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Two key facts are present here that, I submit, warrant 
that we proceed with extra caution. First, the policy is being 
applied based on membership in a group, specifically, in a 
religious group; the individual conduct that results in the 
purported basis for the imposition of the restriction is not 
violent or threatening activity, but, rather, is religious 
observance essentially protected by the First Amendment. 
Second, the cognitive "leap" from the fact of membership in 
a religion to the validity of a concern about security is not 
an automatic one, not "common sense," and we must 
require a showing of the proper fit between membership in 
the religious group and valid security concerns. 
 
The confluence of these two factors should cause us to 
pause and consider the appropriate test, and the applicable 
evidentiary burden. We have noted that the first prong of 
Turner is subject to the test of a "means-end fit," which we 
have described as follows: 
 
       We may conclude that the statute bears no "valid, 
       rational connection" to rehabilitation if "the logical 
       connection between the [statute] and the asserted goal 
       is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 
       irrational." 
 
Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). We went 
on to explain: "This standard is similar to rational-basis 
review, under which a statutory classification can be 
declared unconstitutional only where the relationship of the 
classification to its asserted goal is `so attenuated as to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
members." However, given that mere possession of materials about FPN 
(the sole basis for Fraise's designation) raises an individual to "core 
member" status and the fact that these individuals will only be released 
from close custody upon repudiation of the religion, together with the 
weak case against Appellants, points to the conclusion that all FPN 
believers who either read or express in any fashion the teachings of the 
Five Percent Nation, are clearly at risk and subject to restrictive 
custody. 
Interestingly, it has been noted that Five Percenters read and learn, 
rather than pray, as their religious observance, and this goes to the 
essence of what is being denied here. See Self-Allah v. Annucci, No. 97- 
CV-607(H), 1999 WL 299310, * 2 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Five Percenters are 
obligated to study and learn the lessons of the Five Percent Nation of 
Islam."). 
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render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.' The 
legislature's judgment therefore need not be perfect, just 
rational." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
But what about the situation where the prison regulation 
targets a specific religious group -- where it does not 
merely burden the exercise of religion, but, rather, 
effectively singles out members of a certain religious group 
for different treatment and denial of free exercise rights?3 I 
suggest that in such a situation we should require an even 
"closer fit" between the religious group's classification and 
the state's proffered security interests. 
 
This unique aspect of this case has not been fully 
explored by the parties, but it is nonetheless troubling. 
Does it make any difference that the group targeted is a 
religion and that "core" membership is the determining 
factor for imposition of restrictions? Is this not more 
insidious than a ban on certain conduct or specific activity 
that happens to have an impact on one's religious beliefs or 
exercise? Laws targeting religious beliefs are clearly suspect;4 
and, the right to religious freedom is not to be surrendered 
at the prison door. See O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 
348 (1987). 
 
When applying the Turner test in a case placing harsh 
restrictions upon inmates with certain religious beliefs, I 
proffer that we should indeed require a "tight" or "closer" fit 
between the correctional system's admittedly legitimate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In order to be released from the STGMU, inmates must sign a "Letter 
of Intention" expressing their intention "to renounce formally and in 
spirit affiliation with all Security Threat Groups." App. at A443. 
 
4. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993) ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible 
. . . ."); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) ("The Free Exercise 
Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, 
or rewarding religious beliefs as such."); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor 
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person `to profess a 
belief or disbelief in any religion."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 304 (1940) ("In every case the power to regulate must be so 
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 
protected freedom."). 
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interest and an inmate's beliefs. The Supreme Court has 
not indicated that the Turner test must be a rigid one and 
has in fact referenced with approval the concept that it 
would be reasonable to require a closer "fit" in certain 
instances, for example, where the threat to the government 
interest is not as great.5 I suggest that a closer fit might be 
required when the inmate's interest -- his religious beliefs 
-- is so significant and the restrictions are so great. 
 
In Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 
1999), we found a rational relationship where the 
authorities denied prisoners the right to read pornographic 
materials. Testimony was presented by two different 
psychologists to the effect that pornographic material would 
thwart the effectiveness of the treatment being given to the 
prisoners -- who were all sex offenders who had exhibited 
"repetitive and compulsive" behavior. The prison authorities 
also referred the court to a considerable body of research 
supporting this view. We upheld the regulation and noted 
that, there, we probably would not have needed the expert 
opinions because " `common sense tells us that prisoners 
are more likely to develop the now-missing self-control and 
respect for others if prevented from poring over pictures 
that are themselves degrading and disrespectful.' " 
Waterman, 183 F.3d at 217 (quoting Amatel v. Reno, 156 
F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Abbott, the Supreme Court noted that where "the nature of the 
asserted governmental interest is such as to require a lesser degree of 
case-by-case discretion, a closer fit between the regulation and the 
purpose it serves may safely be required." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 
401, 411-12 (1989) (discussing and overruling Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396 (1974)). The Supreme Court explained that the rejection of the 
regulation in Martinez was based on the Court's "recognition that the 
regulated activity centrally at issue in that case-- outgoing personal 
correspondence from prisoners -- did not, by its very nature, pose a 
serious threat to prison order and security." Id. at 411. The Court 
clarified: "We do not believe that Martinez  should, or need, be read as 
subjecting the decisions of prison officials to a strict `least 
restrictive 
means' test." Abbott, 490 U.S. at 411. The Court overruled Martinez as 
far as it suggested a legal distinction between incoming correspondence 
from prisoners and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners. Id. at 
413-14. 
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However, this reasoning does not apply here. There, we 
approved of a ban on certain literature based on specific 
objective criteria demonstrably consistent with legitimate 
penological objectives; here, we are faced with a round-up 
of all members of a purportedly violent religion so that they 
can be subjected to religious "detox" in the name of 
security. I submit that if prison authorities are to be 
permitted to target and categorize a certain religion so as to 
severely circumscribe First Amendment rights, based solely 
on membership in the religion, we should require that the 
first prong of the Turner v. Safley test be satisfied only by, 
at a minimum, a close fit between the targeted religion and 
problem sought to be avoided, here, to "minimize the 
occurrence of assaults on staff and inmates," and 
evidentiary requirements that leave no room for doubt. To 
require any less is to permit -- perhaps encourage-- 
profiling: that is, the arbitrary attribution of certain 
characteristics to a group and, therefore, members of that 
group, resulting in denial of rights and different, 
disadvantaged treatment. 
 
Further, it would be one thing if the prisons were only 
"profiling" security threat groups that are clearly violent 
"gangs;" but, here, the District Court assumed that the Five 
Percent Nation was a religion.6 The evidence before the 
District Court was woefully lacking that membership in the 
Five Percent Nation carried with it a set of beliefs that each 
member acts upon to promote violence and disorder. 7 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This case would present different issues had the District Court not 
assumed that the Five Percent Nation was a religion. The Court would 
have been required to determine whether FPN would be considered a 
religion, and therefore accorded the protections provided by the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. As this issue is not before us, 
and was not before the District Court, we need not decide whether the 
FPN would satisfy these requirements, but only stress that non- 
traditional belief systems found to be religious in nature will be 
afforded 
the same protections as traditional ones. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 
F.2d 1025, 1031-32 (3d Cir. 1981) (setting forth three indicia to be used 
in determining whether a "religion" is at issue). 
 
7. While the FPN tenets may be racial in tone, racism is not the same as 
violence. See McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1987) 
("[P]rison authorities have no legitimate penological interest in 
excluding 
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District Court relied on a report prepared by Ronald Holvey, 
an eighteen-year veteran employee of the New Jersey 
correctional system. His credentials consist largely of on- 
the-job training,8 and his report includes no proof of what, 
I suggest, is required -- namely, that membership equates 
to an active commitment to violence. Instead, the report is 
anecdotal, recounting, as the Appellees even note in their 
brief, "twelve violent or threateningly violent incidents 
involving a member or members of the Five Percent Nation" 
during a seven year period. Appellees' Brief, p. 14. There is 
no proof of violent gang activity involving FPN members in 
New Jersey prisons, and none of the incidents links the 
conduct to the members' religious beliefs.9 Mr. Holvey cites 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
religious books from the prison library merely because they contain 
racist views. Courts have repeatedly held that prisons may not ban all 
religious literature that reflects racism."); Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 
F.3d 1466, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Turner and observing that 
"[m]erely `advocating racial purity' is insufficient to justify 
confiscati[ng]" 
religious material, and upholding the confiscation of the book 
Christianities Ancient Enemy because it directly advocates violence by 
issuing an explicit "call to arms for white Christians to fight back in `a 
war for survival' "); Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrs., 814 F.2d 1252, 
1257 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that restriction of inmate access to racist 
religious materials "must be limited to those materials that advocate 
violence or that are so racially inflammatory as to be reasonably likely 
to 
cause violence at the prison"); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751, 756-57 
(7th Cir. 1976) (striking down a regulation banning all racist periodicals 
in prison because the regulation "is not narrow enough to reach only 
that material which encourages violence, and invites prison officials to 
apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards"). 
 
8. Holvey has eighteen years of experience in corrections employment, 
including service as a corrections officer. Appellees note that he belongs 
to several national or regional law enforcement or intelligence 
organizations, including the National Major Gang Task Force, and that 
he has assisted several states and organizations, including the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, with the process of identifying security threat 
groups and members as well as training. Holvey Deposition, App. at 
A249-50, 254-58. 
 
9. The majority characterizes the Holvey Report as reporting a "string of 
incidents" and as citing "numerous instances of actual or planned 
violence involving Five Percenters in New Jersey correctional facilities 
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absolutely no statistics with respect to crimes by Five 
Percent Nation members, as compared to crimes by other 
groups. In fact, in pointing out that one in seven prison 
inmates is a member of the Five Percent Nation, the paucity 
of violent incidents purported to be linked to FPN members 
actually casts doubt on the violent nature of the group. No 
showing was made that there was a greater proportion of 
violence by FPN members than by groups of other kinds, 
such as Christians, Jews, or Muslims. The evidence is 
probative only of the assertion that there are several 
members of the FPN that have committed violent or unruly 
acts. 
 
Nowhere in their brief do Appellees counter, let alone 
point to evidence that would meet, Appellants' statement 
that the Five Percent Nation's "teaching does not in any 
way advocate or encourage violence or disorderliness."10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
between August 1990 and July 1997." Maj. at 15. In reality, a careful 
scrutiny of the report and corresponding attachments reveals very little 
evidence of planned or actual violence by FPN members, let alone by the 
Five Percent Nation as a group. In his report, Holvey lists twelve 
"Specific 
Violent Acts/Intended Acts of Violence/Specific Illegal or Prohibited 
Acts." App. at A342-43. Of this twelve, three do not even involve the New 
Jersey correctional facilities, App. at A402-03, 404-11, and two more 
relate to New Jersey youth facilities -- one involving a gathering of 
approximately 50 FPN and NETA members, and the other consisting of 
a fight including some believed to be FPN members. App. at SA41-46. Of 
the remaining seven incidents there were two gatherings, App. at SA24- 
29, A412, and three incidents involving a single FPN member. App. at 
SA5-20, SA48-56. There was only one report of a series of altercations 
allegedly involving more than one FPN member along with several Sunni 
Muslims. App. at SA37-39. And one letter allegedly from an FPN member 
threatening violence against prison guards. SA21. None of these 
incidents reflects activity atypical of aggressive behavior one would 
anticipate in a prison setting. The incidents cited in the report do not 
demonstrate the FPN's violent tendencies as a group or gang in the New 
Jersey prison system. The report conflates incidents from other places, 
as well as violence by other inmates where a FPN member may have 
been tangentially involved, with incidents involving the FPN as a group. 
 
10. Moreover, it should be noted that Appellees in their brief really fail 
to 
address the underlying "disconnect" that I perceive, but urge instead 
that the threat group policy is related to a legitimate goal. Appellants 
concede this, but argue that the designation of the Five Percent Nation 
is not so related because there is no valid connection in the New Jersey 
prison system between the Five Percent Nation and security concerns. 
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App. Br. at 22. Rather, the District Court and the majority 
allude to the findings of other courts to the effect that the 
Five Percent Nation fosters violence. Those courts based 
their rulings on evidence before them, involving the facts 
presented to them. The District Court here should demand 
no less, but only the Holvey report was presented and relied 
upon. There is no basis for the District Court to take 
judicial notice of the evidence before other courts. 
 
Further, most of the decisions referenced by the District 
Court and the majority, in addition to being non- 
precedential, are either distinguishable or not relevant.11 In 
the most persuasive and well-reasoned opinion cited, Self- 
Allah v. Annucci, No. 97-CV-607(H), 1999 WL 299310, *2 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999), the issue is quite different -- whether the 
court would enjoin the prison authorities' confiscation of 
the prisoners' copies of The Five Percenter. The injunction 
was denied, based upon extensive testimony and evidence 
presented with respect to the violent propensity of the Five 
Percenters in the New York system. Many witnesses 
testified (including Mr. Holvey) in favor of the relationship 
between the gang violence in the system and the group. The 
Court concluded: 
 
       Plaintiff has demonstrated that Five Percenterism, in 
       its pure, uncorrupted form, represents a system of 
       beliefs which, outside the prison context, does not 
       advocate or promote violence. However, the testimony 
       presented by defendants showed a clear relationship 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See Allah v. Beyer, 1994 WL 549614, at *1-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1994) 
(upholding the transfer of FPN member where there was specific evidence 
that the inmate took a leadership role in planning a violent uprising in 
the prison); Box v. Petsock, 697 F. Supp. 821, 831 (M.D. Pa. 1987) 
(considering petitioner's religious affiliation in the context of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Abed v. Comm'r of Corrs., 682 
A.2d 558 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that petitioner, not an FPN 
member, did not have a liberty interest in good-time credit); Allah v. 
Dep't of Corrs., 742 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) ("We 
accept the argument of the DOC that it neither `targeted' a religion nor 
classified religious beliefs as a security threat group, but merely 
designated an association of inmates based on its history of violence as 
a security threat group."); Buford v. Goord , 686 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1999) (upholding a ban on FPN literature). 
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       between Five Percenter literature and prison gang 
       activities. 
 
Id. at *9. The majority is misguided to suggest that this 
supports their conclusion "that inmates belonging to the 
Five Percent Nation present a serious security threat." Maj. 
at 16 (emphasis added). There is a very important 
difference between a threat posed by "belonging" to a 
religion and that allegedly posed by the circulation of the 
group's literature. 
 
In the only other court of appeals case involving a similar 
threat group policy, In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of 
Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464 (4th 
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Five Percenters], the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted its jurisprudence as 
requiring "some minimally rational relationship," id. at 468, 
and emphasized the Supreme Court's jurisprudence calling 
for deference, especially when dealing with state 
correctional institutions and the preservation of order 
therein. Id. at 469 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, and Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). The court noted 
"ample evidence in the records" supporting the 
reasonableness of the conclusion that they posed a threat 
to prison security, including incidents in 1992, 1993, and 
three specific incidents in 1995, and referenced at least one 
incident report in which it was stated that " `these five 
inmates acted as a group,' that they `felt as if they were 
acting in a manner acceptable to the[ir] religious beliefs,' 
and that they `spoke of more violence to come.' " Id. at 466. 
The prisoners in that case were not denied their religious 
literature (this claim had been settled), and the court gave 
great deference to the prison system's decision as 
"manifestly a rational action." Id. at 470. The court went on 
to explain: 
 
       The question is not whether [the South Carolina 
       Department of Corrections ("SCDC") director's] 
       conclusion was indisputably correct, but whether his 
       conclusion was rational and therefore entitled to 
       deference. Confronted with multiple reports of an 
       identifiable group whose members not only threatened 
       but had actually committed serious, violent acts in the 
       SCDC system and elsewhere, [SCDC Director's] 
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       decision to designate the Five Percenters as an STG 
       was manifestly a rational action. 
 
Id. at 470 (citation omitted). It explained:"Allowing prison 
officials to act only after a demonstration of individual 
dangerousness would deprive them of the all-important 
option of prevention. The threat of violence here was a 
group threat, and prison administrators were entitled to 
address it in those terms." Id. at 466. 
 
While I think the test of "minimally" rational relationship 
has not been employed by our court and chips away at 
Turner, I cannot argue with the result reached in that case.12 
The group had been identified based on clear, repeated past 
group violent conduct, attributable to its set of beliefs. But 
we have no such evidentiary record here. Accordingly, not 
only is the purported relationship more tenuous but the 
genuineness of the security threat is more remote as well. 
Additionally, the restrictions there did not include denial of 
literature, which is at the heart of the FPN's exercise. In the 
case before us, the implications are much more far- 
reaching and the evidence much less relevant and 
convincing. There has been no showing of the "means-end 
fit" to satisfy the wholesale denial of religious freedom and 
exercise. 
 
If the inquiry does not satisfy the first prong of Turner, 
which we have explained received the greatest weight, the 
prison's action must fail. See Shaw v. Murphy , 532 U.S. 
223, 121 S. Ct. 1475, 1479 (2001) ("If the connection 
between the regulation and the asserted goal is`arbitrary or 
irrational,' then the regulation fails, irrespective of whether 
the other factors tilt in its favor."). Therefore, we need not 
reach the other prongs. However, I cannot help but note my 
disagreement with the ease with which the majority 
dispenses with the second and third prong as well. The 
answer to the "alternate means" prong is really self-evident 
-- the prison authorities' course of "treatment" is designed 
to cause the FPN adherent to give up his faith, not permit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In Shaw v. Murphy, Justice Thomas referred to rebutting the 
presumption of rationality. However, that language was dicta and I 
suggest did not lower the standard of Turner , nor did it require the 
burden of proof to fall on the plaintiff. 
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him to practice it. This is much different than the facts 
before the Fourth Circuit in Five Percenters, where the 
court found that because the prisoners could still pray, fast 
and study religious materials, the "alternate means" test 
was satisfied, and the proven violence satisfied the"no 
ready alternatives" prong. In the course of this treatment, 
the FPN member is barred from the teachings, which are at 
the heart of the Five Percent Nation religious experience. 
Furthermore, to be released from close custody he must 
promise to never again affiliate with FPN. Thus, the desired 
result of the treatment is to eradicate the belief. It is 
difficult to see how, realistically, there are "alternate 
means" here. 
 
In connection with the "impact of the accommodation on 
others" prong, here, the premise that potential violence 
cannot be accommodated assumes the very violence that I 
suggest has not been shown. I would suggest that the 
absence of a showing of the violent connection as discussed 
above undermines the findings of the District Court and the 
majority with respect to this prong as well. 
 
We have in this country a rich tradition of protecting 
individual rights, including the rights of prisoners. We have 
explained that "the Supreme Court has made clear that 
`convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional 
protections by reason of their conviction and confinement 
in prison' " DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 
(1979)). Furthermore, " `Inmates clearly retain protections 
afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its directive 
that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." Id. 
(quoting O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). At 
the same time, we have a fast-developing body of law to the 
effect that, while inmates do not shed their constitutional 
protections at the jailhouse door, nonetheless "a prison 
inmate `retains [only] those rights that are not inconsistent 
with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system,' " id. at 51 
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)), and 
"the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more 
limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by 
individuals in society at large." Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 
223, 229 (2001). 
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We have, at times, overreacted in response to perceived 
characteristics of groups thought to be dangerous to our 
security or way of life and condemned individuals based on 
group membership. See, e.g., Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 
341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding requirement that all city 
employees must disclose membership to the Communist 
party and swear an oath of loyalty); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming the constitutionality 
of "excluding" people of Japanese descent from the West 
Coast during World War II). Only later, when we have 
viewed these reactions with some perspective, have we 
acknowledged that the wholesale treatment of certain 
groups was not consistent with the basic tenets of our 
democracy. Here, similarly, it seems as though there is a 
rush to brand the Five Percent Nation as a "violent" 
religious sect. But, who is next? Would it be the Sunni 
Muslims, whose tenets, Appellants argue, are similar? 
Would it be the Nation of Islam, viewed by some as racist? 
While these may be inmates, and prisoners, they are 
nonetheless people. We should therefore be concerned, and 
be careful in labeling and judging them based solely on 
membership in a religious group. 
 
If membership in such groups can objectively be shown, 
upon close scrutiny, to be equated to posing a real threat 
of violence in the prison setting, then treatment of such 
group members in wholesale fashion, even though it 
deprives them of their constitutional rights, would be 
consistent with legitimate penological objectives, and would 
be permissible. Otherwise, such discriminatory treatment 
treads impermissibly on their constitutional rights. 
 
I would reverse the District Court's ruling and deny 
defendant's motion for summary judgment for lack of a 
showing that the first prong of the Turner v. Safley test has 
been satisfied.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. I see no need to address Appellants' equal protection or due 
process claims. I agree with the majority that we apply the same Turner 
analysis to Appellants' equal protection claim that we did to their First 
Amendment claims, and my concerns with the majority's Turner analysis 
carries over to the equal protection analysis as well. On the other hand, 
I will not provide my own reasoning regarding Appellants' due process 
claim, as I agree with that provided by the majority. 
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